Abstract
This study asks what makes regional alliances durable in a distributed-power order, examining six existing arrangements by their dispute-resolution mechanisms and exit costs. It finds that alliances built on interlocking economic interests outlast those built on a shared threat alone.
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References
- Al-Qahtani, S. (2026). Arab strategic autonomy. EISSL.
- Al-Otaibi, H. (2025). Exit costs in regional arrangements. Institute Policy Papers, 6, 5–31.
Cite this specimen
Omar Al-Fahad. (2026). Regional Alliances After Unipolarity: Conditions of Durability. EISSL.
